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ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-FEES-STATUTORY REGULATION.-The Workmen's Com-
pensation Act provided that claims for legal services arising under that statute
were enforcible only if approved by the Commision. The respondent, an attor-
ney, entered into a contract with his client's brother whereby the latter was to
pay him fifty per cent, of the amount awarded the client by the Workmen's
Compensation Commission. Disciplinary proceedings were instituted by the bar
association against the respondent. Held, that it is contrary to legal ethics for
attorneys to charge fees of greater amount than that fixed by the Compensation
Commissioner. Matter of Fisch (igig, N. Y.) 6I N. Y. L. J. 1234.
Generally it is not illegal or against public policy for a lawyer to prosecute
an action on a contingent fee basis. See Stevens v. Sheriff (I97) 76 Kan. 124,
i27, 9o Pac. 799, 8oo. However, it was the purpose and intent of the Compen-
sation Act to prevent this in order to insure the injured workman as large a
return as possible. It is therefore submitted that the court properly squelched
this attempt to indirectly evade the beneficent objects contemplated by this
legislation. For a discussion of the duties of attorneys, see (I91I) 21 YALE
LAW JOURNAL, 72.
CARRIERS-CARMAcK AMENDMENT-PR-SUmPTION AGAINST TERmINAL CAR-
RmR.--In an action against the terminal carrier to recover damages for injury to
goods, the plaintiff introduced evidence to show that the goods were delivered
in good condition to the initial carrier and were received from the defendant in
a damaged condition. The defendant contended that since the passage of the
Carmack Amendment this did not make a prima facie case. Held, that the
plaintiff had made a prima facie case, as the common-law presumption against
the terminal carrier was not superseded by the Carmack Amendment. Central
of Georgia Ry. v. Scrivens (1919, Ga. Ct. App.) ioo S. E. 233.
It is settled law that the Carmack Amendment did not deprive the shipper
of his right of action against the connecting carrier, but merely gave an additional
remedy against the initial carrier when the goods were taken on a "through"
bill of lading. Georgia, Fla. & Ala. Ry. v. Blish Co. (1915) 241 U. S. 190, 36
Sup. Ct. 541. And so it did not affect the common-law presumption involved in
the principal case, against the terminal carrier. Erisman v. Chicago B. & Q.
R. R. (1917) 18o Iowa, 759, 163 N. W. 627. For a discussion of the liability of
carriers under the Carmack Amendment, see Daish, Liability of Common
Carriers under the Act to Regulate Commerce (i916) 25 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
341.
CONFLICT OF LAws-LAPsING OF LFAClES-"RENVOI."-One T, a citizen of the
United States, whose domicile of origin was in New York, died in France, where
he had acquired a domicile. He left a will in which he bequeathed his residuary
estate in equal parts to an aunt and a cousin. The cousin having died before T,
her share would accrue to the aunt under French law, while it would lapse under
the law of New York and go to the testator's brother. The latter opposed the
proposed distribution, contending that the law of the domicile (sec. 47, Decedent
Estate Law) in accordance with which the New York courts would determine the
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question, referred to the French law in its totality, including its rules of the
conflict of laws, and as the French law would decide the case according to the
law of the country to which the testator belonged (lex patriae) the New York
court should apply New York law. Held, that sec. 47 of the Decedent Estate
law referred to the French law relating to the lapsing of legacies, and not to the
French law in its totality, including the conflict of laws. Referee's report,
approved by the Surrogate of New York County. In the Matter of the Judicial
Settlement of the Accounts of Henry Overing Talmnadge, Executor of Coster
Chadwick, Deceased (1919) 62 N. Y. L. J. 215.
See CO ENTS, supra, p. 214.
CONTRACTs-BBEAcH-WAVER-DAMAGEs.-By a contract with the defendant
the plaintiff obtained the exclusive selling agency within a certain territory, of
machines which the defendant manufactured. After the plaintiff entered into
this business, the defendant forbade his taking orders for machines to be used
in "public service," on the ground that another party had the exclusive privilege
of such sales. The plaintiff continued the business for a while and then
terminated the agency. He sued for the damages which resulted from this
limitation of his agency. The defendant contended that the plaintiff had waived
this breach of contract and therefore could not recover damages. Held, that he
could recover, since waiver of a breach does not forfeit a right of action for
the resulting damages. Hoffer v. Hooven-Owens-Rentschiler Co. (1919, Sup. Ct.)
177 N. Y. Supp. 720.
The distinction between a waiver of excuse for future nonperformance and
a forfeiture of a right to damages, both arising from a breach of contract by
the other party thereto, is undoubtedly sound. In support of this, see (1918) 28
YALE LAW JouRNAL, 86.
MINES AND MINERALS-INTERFERENCE BY ABANDONED OIL WELL WITH LiV
Ww..-After the plaintiff had sunk a well on his premises which produced oil,
the defendant sunk a well on his premises near the plaintiff's well, which proved
a non-producer and was abandoned. It caused air to leak into the plaintiff's
pump, resulting in loss of suction and a material reduction in the production of
oil from the plaintiff's well. The defendant refused to close his well, though
he could have done so without trouble or expense by putting back the plug
which had been taken out. The plaintiff sued for an injunction and damages.
Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to relief. Higgins Oil & Fuel Co. v.
Guaranty Oil Co., Ltd. (1gig, La.) 82 So. 2o6.
See CommENTs, supra, p. 213.
NEGLIGENcE-CoNTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENE-LAST CLEAR CHANCE-The plaintiff's
intestate negligently started across the defendant's track and was killed by an
engine operated by employees of the defendant. The employees exercised due
care and did all they could to avert the accident. The plaintiff sued for damages.
Held, that she could not recover, with a dictum that where "negligence of the
railroad and of the person injured are concurrent and continue up to the
moment of the accident," a railroad cannot be held liable under the doctrine
of "last clear chance." Nolan v. Illinois Central R. R. (igig, La.) 82 So. 590.
The court seems to apply the concept that "last clear chance" means sole
physical power in the defendant, after he has actually obtained knowledge
of the plaintiff's danger, to avoid the injury. Other authority finds the require-
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ment satisfied if the defendant was in a position to have acquired such knowledge
by reasonably prudent conduct. Bond v. Baltimore & 0. R. R. (1918, W. Va.)
96 S. E. 932. For full discussion of the whole doctrine, see COMMENT (1914)
24 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 330.
NEGLIGENcE-PROXIMATE CAUSE-INTERVENING AGENCIES-INHERENTLY DAN-
GEROUS ARTIcLEs -The defendant manufactured and sold the "King air rifle,"
which was advertised as harmless. A rifle containing a load of shot, due to
the negligence of an employee, was shipped in a consignment from the defend-
ant's plant to a wholesale house for resale. The wholesale dealer, unaware that
this rifle was loaded, sold the lot to a retail dealer, who, likewise ignorant,
placed it in stock in charge of the plaintiff, a saleswoman in his store. During
an examination of this rifle by a prospective customer, it was discharged,
seriously injuring the plaintiff who sued for the resulting damages. Held, that
recovery should be allowed. Herman v. Markham Air Rifle Co. (I918, D. Mich.)
258 Fed. 475.
The court justified its holding on three grounds: that the defendant was
negligent; that such an intervention by a third party was forseeable under such
circumstances; that the rifle was inherently dangerous. The effect of an inter-
vention by a third party upon the originally negligent party's liability is discussed
in (1918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 713, io87. For a treatment of the liability
of a manufacturer for damages resulting from a defective article, see (1918)
27 ibid., 61I. See also (1918) 27ibid., 713; COMMENT (1918) 27 ibid., io68.
NEGLIGENE---RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF VEHICLES AND PmESmIANS.-The plain-
tiff's intestate was struck and killed by the defendant's automobile while he was
attempting to cross a street diagonally, not at a regular crossing. In an action
by his administratrix to recover damages for his death, it was proved that the
deceased, before starting across the street, observed the traffic and that there
were no vehicles to obstruct either his view or that of the defendant, who was
approaching on the same side of the street about one hundred feet away. The
defendant claimed that the plaintiff's failure to show that the deceased looked
to the right or left after he started to cross the street was fatal to the
present claim. Held, that such proof was unnecessary, as the plaintiff was
"entitled to the presumption that deceased did that which a prudent man would
do under the circumstances, and that he continued to do so until the accident
took place." Anderson v. Wood (ig1g, Pa.) io7 Atl. 658.
The court remarks in the opinion that, although an automobile may have a
"slightly superior right of way between crossings," a pedestrian cannot be held
negligent, as a matter of law, when he attempts to cross a street between the
regular crossings; on the contrary, if, having observed the traffic and it is so
distant that one using due care would deem it safe to cross, he makes such an
attempt, it is the duty of an approaching driver not to injure him; and also the
pedestrian is under no "fixed duty" to look back although the circumstances
may be such that in the exercise of due care it would be his duty to do so. Some
of the factors and circumstances to be considered in determining whether a
driver has violated his duty to exercise "greater caution in respect to children
than in respect to grown up people" are stated in Di Maio v. Yolen Botfling
Works (1919, Conn.) 107 AtI. 497. The general principle of 'reasonable care"
applicable to the principal case has also been recently stated by Justice Gager in
Brown v. New Haven Taxicab Co. (1919) 93 Conn. 251; 254, 255, io5 At. 7o6, 707.
Cf. also (I918) 28 YALE LAW JouRNA-, 91.
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PERSONS- INSA E PERSONS - GUARDIAN AD LiTEm - ADMISSIONS- RELIEF
AGAINST JUDGMENTS.-The plaintiff's ward, while insane, conveyed land to the
defendants, who knew of her disability. The conveyance was confirmed by a
judgment rendered upon admissions by her guardian ad litem that the transaction
was fair and beneficial. The guardian ad litem was benefited by the sale and
the price was below market value. The plaintiff sued to recover this land. Held,
that the judgment was voidable and the plaintiff was entitled to the relief sought.
Knight v. Waggoner (igig, Tex. Civ. App.) 214 S. W. 69o.
The decision seems clearly correct. Admissions by a guardian ad litem are
generally not binding upon a ward. Policy seems to require this protection, not
only against unwise admissions by honest guardians but also against statements
by those who are dishonest. And, indeed, the prevailing doctrine affords such
protection by requiring the adverse party to prove all the material allegations of
his bill, regardless of any admissions made by the guardian ad litem. See 4 ANN.
CASES 403, -note.
PROPERTY-GAs LEAsE-REGULATIoN-LEssoR's F=E USE OF NATURAL GAS.-
The defendant leased land to the plaintiff for the production of oil and gas, with
a stipulation in the lease that the defendant should be permitted, for domestic
purposes, to use gas from any well drilled upon the premises, free of charge.
In accordance with this provision, gas was being furnished to the defendant.
The Public Service Commission adopted a rule that all gas furnished without
charge should be metered, and that reports should be made to it monthly of the
quantities of gas so furnished. The defendant removed a meter which the
plaintiff installed on the defendant's supply line in compliance with this order of
the Commission, and the plaintiff brought suit for an injunction, asking that the
defendant be restrained from interfering with the installation of a meter on the
supply line and the maintenance and reading of the same at proper intervals.
Held, that such relief should be granted. Pittsburgh & West Virginia Gas Co.
v. Richardson (1919, W. Va.) ioo S. E. 2o.
The court determined: first, that the defendant had a right under the lease to
be supplied with so much gas free of charge by the plaintiff as was reasonably
necessary for his domestic purposes; second, that the plaintiff was privileged
to determine whether or not the defendant was using more gas than he reason-
ably required; third, that the defendant was under a duty not to interfere with
the exercise of such privilege. The regulation of the Commission was appro-
priate and not only gave to the plaintiff a privilege to install the meter but also
made it his duty to do so.
PROPERTY-PROFITS A PRENDRE-IN GROss-ABANDONMENT.-In 187I E con-
veyed part of his farm to the plaintiff's predecessors in title, reserving to himself,
his heirs and assigns, all the waste or rubbish stones which might be obtained
from working quarries on the land conveyed "and the right to remove the same
at pleasure." The remainder of the farm came by mesne conveyances to the
defendant, the intermediate owners having occasionally exercised the privilege
given by the reservation. E died in 1887 and in 1917 his heirs and next of kin
conveyed all their interest under the reservation to H who conveyed to the
defendant. There was no evidence of user by E or his heirs or next of kin.
The plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant from entering to remove the stones.
Held (two judges dissenting) that the interest reserved constituted a profit
a prendre, that it was in gross and not appurtenant to the land retained, and
hence it had been abandoned. Mathews Slate Co. v. Advance Industrial Supply
Co. (1918, N. Y. App. Div.) 172 N. Y. Supp. 83o.
See COMMENTS, supra, p. 218.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
PROPERTY-TENANCY IN COmmoN-LEAsE BY TENANT AND ADmINISTRATRIX OF
CO-TENANT-RATIFICATION BY SOME OF THE HEIR.-M and his co-tenant, P's
administratrix, leased a part of the joint premises to the defendant's intestate.
P's estate was settled and his interest in the premises distributed to his heirs,
among whom were the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs, having previously obtained a
judgment against the defendants annulling the lease from the date of the final
accounting of the administratrix brought ejectment for the premises. The
defendants claimed to hold under M, who had accepted rent, and under P's
other heirs, who had consented and approved. Held, that the defendants were
entitled to possession jointly with the plaintiffs. Wheeler, J. dissenting. Pastine
v. Altman (i919, Conn.) io7 Atl. 803.
This decision places Connecticut in line with the more general rule that a
conveyance by a tenant in common by metes and bounds is not absolutely void,
as was held in Griswold v. Johnson (1824) 5 Conn. 363, and other early Con-
necticut decisions, but will be given effect so far as not prejudicial to the co-ten-
ants. While the grantee is not entitled, as against co-tenants, to a judgment of
partition giving him the exact portion of the premises covered by his conveyance,
he is entitled to the use and possession of the premises in common with the
others until partition is had. Ballou v. Hale (1867) 47 N. H. 347; see Stark v.
Barrett (i86o) i5 Calif. 36r, 368. But see Shepardson v. Rowland (i871) :28
Wis. io8. The decision seems correct that partition, and not 'ejectment, is the
proper remedy for plaintiffs. See 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 573, note. Incidentally
the case shows that an administrator can lease, but only during the period of
settlement of the estate.
TRIAL-VEDIcr-AFFDAvrrs OF JuRoRs.-On a motion for an appeal, the de-
fendant offered an affidavit signed by five of the jurors that his counter-claim
had not been considered in fixing the damages. The absence of the affidavits
of the other seven jurors was explained. Held, that the court did not have
the power to grant the motion, with a dictum that the affidavits were admissible,
since they "do not assail the verdict in any'way; they explain it . . ." Zunino
v. Parodi Cigar Co. (1919, Sup. Ct) 176 N. Y. Supp. 319.
The court apparently recognized the majority doctrine that affidavits by the
jurors of conduct in the jury room are not admissible to impeach their verdict.
But it is difficult to see how the affidavits in the instant case would not have
such an effect. See (I918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 417.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATIoN-CoNSTRUCTION OF STATuTEs.-The plaintiff brought
an action against his employer for negligence in furnishing him a defective
meat grinder to work with, which caused the loss of his hand. The defendant
pleaded contributory negligence. The court ruled that the defendant was de-
prived of that defence because of his failure to elect to come under the Work-
men's Compensation Act. Held, that this ruling was erroneous since the business
in which the defendant was engaged was not within the Act. Williams v. Schehl
(IgIg,.W. Va.) I00 S. E. 280.
In arriving at this conclusion, the court was guided by the principle that a
statute in derogation of the common law should be construed strictly. This well
established rule of statutory construction has, however, been applied infrequently
in, construing Workmen's Compensation Acts and it has generally been held that,
being highly remedial in character, they should be construed liberally to effectuate
their purpose. Milwaukee v. Miller (1913) 154 Wis. 652, 144 N. W. 188;
Powers v. Hotel Bond Co. (1915) 89 Conn. 143, 146, 93 Atl. 245, 247. See
(1918) 27 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 419. Few jurisdictions apply the rule of the
instant case. See L. R. A. 19i6A 215, note.
